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It is much too early to give a definitive assessment of
the crisis, not least because it is far from over. It is
not too early, however, to look for the basic mecha-
nisms that have taken us where we are today and to
think about the policies we need to implement now
and later.
Let me start with Figure 1.The first column (which
is barely visible) shows the estimated losses on US
subprime loans and securities as of October 2007
amounting to about USD 250 billion. The second
column shows the expected cumulative loss in
world output associated with the crisis, based on
current forecasts. This loss is constructed as the
sum, over all countries, of the expected cumulative
deviation of output from trend in each country,
based on IMF estimates and forecasts of output as
of November 2008, for the years 2008 to 2015.
Based on these forecasts,the cumulative loss is pro-
jected to run at USD 4,700 billion, or about twenty
times the initial subprime loss. The third column
shows the decrease in the value
of stock markets, measured as
the sum,over all markets,of the
decrease in stock market capi-
talization from September 2007
to November 2008. This loss is
equal to about USD 26,400 billion, or about one
hundred times the initial subprime loss! The ques-
tion is obvious: how could such a relatively limited
and localized event as the subprime loan crisis in
the United States have effects of such magnitude
on the world economy?2
To answer this question,I shall proceed in four steps:
First, by identifying the essential initial conditions
which have shaped the crisis. I see them as fourfold:
the underestimation of risk contained in newly
issued assets;the opacity of the derived securities on
the balance sheets of financial institutions; the con-
nectedness between financial institutions, both with-
in and across countries;and,finally,the high leverage
of the financial system as a whole.
Second, by identifying the two amplification mecha-
nisms behind the crisis, once the trigger had been
pulled and some of the assets appeared bad or
doubtful. I see two related, but distinct, mechanisms:
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2 Ironically, the other shock which dominated the news until the
financial crisis led to the opposite question: how could the very
large increase in oil prices from the early 2000s to mid-2008 have
such a small apparent impact on economic activity? After all, simi-
lar increases are typically blamed for the very deep recessions of
the 1970s and early 1980s. The plausible answer, which I shall not
explore in this lecture, but which is very much worth investigating,
must be that the economy has become less fragile in some dimen-
sions, more fragile in others.first, the sale of assets to satisfy liquidity runs by
investors; and, second, the sale of assets to reestab-
lish capital ratios. Together with the initial condi-
tions, these mechanisms can lead, and indeed have
led, to very large effects of a small trigger on world
economic activity.
Third, by showing how the amplification mecha-
nisms have played out in real time,moving from sub-
prime to other assets, from one institution to anoth-
er, and from the United States, first to Europe, and
then to emerging countries.
Fourth, by turning to policies. It is too late to change
the initial conditions for this crisis.Therefore,current
policies should be aimed at limiting the two amplifi-
cation mechanisms at work at this juncture. Future
regulation and policies should also aim, however, at
avoiding a repeat of some of those initial conditions.
In short, we need to both fight current fires and
reduce the risk of fires in the future.
Initial conditions
The trigger for the crisis was the decline in housing
prices in the United States. But, in the years pre-
ceding, four developments had combined to poten-
tially turn such a price decline into a major world
crisis.
Assets were created,sold and bought,which appeared
much less risky than they truly were
Conditional on no housing price decline, most sub-
prime mortgages appeared relatively riskless: the
value of the mortgage might be high relative to the
price of the house but it would slowly decline over
time as prices increased. In retrospect, the fallacy of
the proposition was in its premise:if and when hous-
ing prices actually declined, many mortgages would
exceed the value of the house, leading to defaults
and foreclosures.3
Why did the people who took these mortgages, and
the institutions which held them, so underestimate
the true risk? Many explanations have been given
and many potential culprits have been named as
well. Let us list some of them: (1) large savings by
Chinese households, leading to a low world interest
rate and thus a “search for yield” by investors dis-
appointed with the return on truly safe assets; (2)
large private and public capital inflows into the
United States in search of safety, leading suppliers
to offer what looked like safe assets to satisfy the
demand; (3) too expansionary a monetary policy in
the United States with the implicit promise of low
interest rates for a long time; (4) the “originate and
distribute” model of mortgage financing, leading to
insufficient monitoring by the loan originators.
Each of these explanations contains a grain of
truth, but only a grain. Why would a low world
interest rate necessarily lead to a “search for
yield”? Why should Alan Greenspan have set a
higher US interest rate, if low interest rates reflect-
ed low equilibrium world rates and there was no
pressure on inflation? Why should investors have
bought mortgages from originators if they knew
that monitoring was deficient?
I suspect that the fundamental explanation is more
general. History teaches us that benign economic
environments often lead to credit booms, and to the
creation of marginal assets and the issuance of mar-
ginal loans.Borrowers and lenders look at recent his-
torical distributions of returns and become more
optimistic, indeed too optimistic, about future
returns.4 The environment was indeed benign in the
2000s in most of the world, with sustained growth
and low interest rates. And, looking in particular at
US housing prices,both borrowers and lenders could
point to the fact that housing prices had increased
every year since 1991, and had done so even during
the recession of 2001.5
Nor was this understatement of risk confined to sub-
prime loans. Credit default swaps (CDS), which
sound complex but are in effect insurance policies,
were issued against many risks.For low premia,firms
and institutions could insure themselves against spe-
cific risks, be it the risk of default by a firm, by a
financial institution or by a country. And CDS
issuers were happy to accept these low premia, as
they assumed the probability of having to pay out
was nearly negligible.
Securitization led to complex and hard-to-value assets
on the balance sheets of financial institutions
Securitization had started much earlier but changed
its scale in the last decade. In mid-2008, more than
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60 percent of all US mortgages were securitized. In
the mortgage market, mortgages were pooled to
form mortgage-based securities (MBS) and the
income streams from these securities were separated
(“tranched”) further to offer more or less risky flows
to investors.
Figure 2, taken from the 2007 IMF Global
Financial Stability Report gives a sense of the com-
plexity of that part of the financial system.It shows
how initial mortgages were securitized, cut in
tranches and then held by various investors and
financial institutions with different degrees of risk
aversion.
Why did securitization take off in such a way?
Because it was, and still is, a major improvement in
risk allocation and a fundamentally healthy devel-
opment. Indeed, looking across countries before
the crisis, many (including myself) concluded that
the US economy would resist a decrease in housing
prices better than most economies: the shock
would be absorbed by a large set of investors,
rather than just by a few financial institutions.This
argument ignored two aspects which turned out to
be important. The first was that, with complexity,
came opacity. While it was possible to assess the
value of simple mortgage pools (MBS), it was
harder to assess the value of the derived tranched
securities (CDOs), and even harder to assess the
value of the derived securities resulting from
tranches of derived securities (CDO2s).Thus, wor-
ries about the original mortgages translated into
large uncertainty about the values of the derived
securities. And, in that environment, the fact that
the securities were held by a large set of financial
institutions implied that this large uncertainty
affected a large number of balance sheets in the
economy.
Securitization and globalization led to increasing
connectedness between financial institutions, both
within and across countries
In the same way as securitization increased con-
nectedness across financial institutions, globaliza-
tion increased the connectedness of financial insti-
tutions across countries. One of the early stories of
the crisis was the surprisingly large exposure of
some regional German banks to US subprime
loans. But the reality goes far beyond this anec-
dote. Figure 3 shows the steady increase in foreign
claims by banks from the major five advanced
countries,an increase from USD 6.3 trillion in 2000
to USD 22 trillion by June 2008. In mid-2008,
claims by these banks just on emerging market
countries exceeded USD 4 trillion. Think of what
this implies if, for any reason, those banks decided
to cut back their foreign exposure; unfortunately,
this is indeed what we are seeing now (The figure




Source: IMF (2007).Leverage increased
The fourth important initial condition was the
increase in leverage. Put another way, financial
institutions financed their portfolios with less and
less capital, thus increasing the rate of return on
that capital. What were the reasons behind it?
Surely, the optimism and the underestimation of
risk were again part of it.Another important factor
was a number of holes in regulation. For example,
banks were allowed to reduce required capital by
moving assets off their balance sheets into so-called
“structured investment vehicles” (SIVs). In 2006,
for instance, the value of the off-balance sheet
assets of Citigroup (= USD 2.1 trillion) exceeded
the value of the assets on the balance sheet (= USD
1.8 trillion). (By mid-2008, the write-downs and
returns of some of the assets back to the balance
sheet had decreased this ratio back to less than one
half.) The problem went far beyond banks: for
example, at the end of 2006, the “monoline insur-
ers” (i.e. insurers insuring a particular risk, e.g.
default on municipal bonds), operating outside the
perimeter of regulation, had capital equal to USD
34 billion to back insurance claims against more
than USD 3 trillion of assets.
Whatever the reason, the implications of high lever-
age for the crisis were straightforward. If, for any
reason, the value of the assets became lower and/or
more uncertain, then the higher the leverage, the
higher the probability that capital would be wiped
out, the higher the probability that institutions
would become insolvent. And this is, again, exactly
what we have seen.
Amplification mechanisms
Around the end of 2006, US
housing price indexes stopped
rising and then started to decline
steadily. This implied that many
marginal mortgages, especially
the subprimes extended during
the previous expansion, would
default. As we saw in Figure 1,
the expected loss from these
defaults as of October 2007
amounted to USD 250 billion.
One might have hoped that this
loss would be easily absorbed by
financial institutions, with limit-
ed financial or economic impli-
cations. But, as we know, this has
not been the case.The larger cri-
sis is the result of two amplification mechanisms,
interacting with the initial conditions I focused on
earlier.
The first amplification mechanism is the modern 
version of bank runs
Let me first go quickly back to basics.Think of finan-
cial institutions in the simplest terms, i.e. with assets
on the left-hand side of their balance sheet,liabilities
on the right-hand side, and capital as the difference
between the value of the assets and the value of the
liabilities.As long as capital is positive,the institution
is solvent; if it is negative, the institution is insolvent.
Therefore, when the probability of default on some
assets increases, both the expected loss and the
uncertainty associated with the asset side of the bal-
ance sheet increases. The value of capital becomes
both lower and more uncertain, increasing the prob-
ability of insolvency. The first amplification mecha-
nism then has two parts.
Depositors and investors are likely to want to take
their funds out of the institutions, which might
become insolvent. In traditional bank runs, say dur-
ing the Great Depression, it was the depositors that
took their money out of the banks.Two changes have
taken place since then. First, in most countries,
depositors are now largely insured, so they have few
incentives to run. And banks and other financial
institutions largely finance themselves in money
markets, through short-term “wholesale funding”.
Modern runs are no longer literally runs: what hap-
pens is that institutions which are perceived as being



















CONSOLIDATED FOREIGN CLAIMS OF REPORTING BANKS ON THE
 REST OF THE WORLD
Classification by nationality of reporting banks
in trillions of US dollars
Source: IMF.
Figure 3CESifo Forum 1/2009 7
Munich Lecture
at risk can no longer finance themselves on these
markets.The result is,however,the same as in the old
bank runs: faced with a decrease in their ability to
borrow, institutions have to sell assets.
To the extent that this is a macroeconomic phe-
nomenon (i.e. to the extent that many institutions
and investors are affected at the same time), there
may be few deep pocket investors willing to buy
assets. If, in addition, the value of the assets is espe-
cially difficult for outside investors to assess, the
assets are likely to sell at “fire sale prices”, i.e.
prices below the expected present value of the pay-
ments on the asset. This, in turn, implies that the
sale of the assets by one institution further con-
tributes to a decrease in the value of all similar
assets, not only on the balance sheet of the institu-
tion which is selling,but on the balance sheets of all
the institutions which hold these assets. This again
reduces their capital,forcing them to sell assets,and
so on.The amplification mechanism is at work, and
you can see how the size of the amplification is
determined by initial conditions.
To the extent that the assets are more opaque and
thus difficult to value, the increase in uncertainty
will be larger, leading to a higher perceived risk of
insolvency, and thus to a higher probability of runs.
For the same reasons, finding outside investors to
buy these assets will be more difficult, and the fire
sale discount will be larger.To the extent that secu-
ritization leads to exposure of a larger set of insti-
tutions, more institutions will be at risk of a run.
And finally, to the extent that institutions are more
leveraged, which means that they have less capital
relative to assets to start with, the probability of
insolvency will rise more,again increasing the prob-
ability of runs. As we have seen, all these factors
were very much present at the start of the crisis.
This is why this amplification mechanism has been
particularly strong.
The second amplification mechanism comes from the
need of financial institutions to maintain an adequate
capital ratio
Faced with a decrease in the value of their assets,
and thus lower capital,financial institutions need to
improve their capital ratio, either to satisfy regula-
tory requirements or to satisfy investors that they
are taking measures to decrease the risk of insol-
vency. In principle, they then have a choice. They
can either get additional funds from outside
investors – the additional capital. Or they can
“deleverage”, i.e. decrease the size of their balance
sheets by selling some of their assets or reducing
their lending.
In a macroeconomic crisis, finding additional pri-
vate capital is likely to be difficult. This is for the
same reasons as earlier: there may be few deep
pocket investors willing to put up funds.And to the
extent that the assets held by the financial institu-
tions are difficult to value, investors will be reluc-
tant to put their funds in the institutions that hold
them. In that case, the only option for these institu-
tions is to sell some of their assets.The same mech-
anism as before is then at work: the sale of assets
leads to fire sale prices, affecting the balance sheets
of all the institutions that hold them, leading to fur-
ther sales and so on. And, for the same reasons as
before, opacity, connectedness and leverage all
imply more amplification.
The two mechanisms are distinct.Conceptually,runs
can happen even in the absence of any initial
decrease in the value of assets. This is the well-
known multiplicity of equilibria: if funding stops,
assets must be liquidated at fire sale prices justifying
the stop in funding in the first place. But, clearly,
runs are more likely the higher the doubts about the
value of the assets. Conceptually, firms may want to
take measures to reestablish their capital ratio even
if they have no short-term funding problem and do
not face runs.The two mechanisms interact, howev-
er, in many ways.A financial institution subject to a
run may,instead of selling assets,cut credit to anoth-
er financial institution, which may in turn be forced
to sell assets. Indeed, one of the channels through
which the crisis has moved from advanced countries
to emerging market countries has been through cuts
in credit lines from financial institutions in
advanced economies to their foreign subsidiaries,
forcing them in turn to sell assets or cut credit to
domestic borrowers.
Dynamics in real time
The amplification mechanisms are now clear, but
this is true only in retrospect. In real time, when
housing prices started declining, most economists
and policy makers expected the impact to be much
more limited.The scope of the amplification mecha-
nisms only became clear over time. Here is the story
in real time.Contagion across assets,
institutions and countries
The widening of the crisis to a
steadily growing number of
assets, institutions and countries
is shown in Figure 4. The figure
is a “heat map” constructed by
the IMF, which shows the evolu-
tion of heat indexes for a num-
ber of asset classes. The con-
struction of the index is complex
but the principle is simple: the
larger the decrease in the price
of the asset, or the higher the
volatility of the price, each rela-
tive to its average value in the
past, the higher the value of the
index. As the heat index increases, the color goes
from green to yellow to orange and to red (corre-
sponding to 1, 2, 3 and 4 standard deviations respec-
tively, so orange and red should be seen as very rare
events).
Figure 4 shows the history of the crisis.Starting from
the bottom, see how the crisis started with subprime
mortgages in early 2007, extended to financial insti-
tutions and money markets (the markets where
financial institutions borrow and lend to each other)
in the summer of 2007, to regular mortgage pools
(Prime RMBS) and corporate credit at the end of
2007, and to emerging market countries in the fall of
2008.At the time of this writing,all classes are in red,
showing an exceptional decrease in prices and
increase in volatility.
Increase in counterparty risk
Figure 5 shows how the crisis led to an increase in
counterparty risk between banks, i.e. to an increase
in the perceived probability that a bank borrowing
from another bank may not be able to repay. For
four different economies it plots the “Ted spread”,
which is the difference between the average rate
charged by banks to each other for 3-month loans
(the “3-month Libor rate), and the three-month T-
bill rate, the rate at which the government can bor-
row. Note how the spreads increased from the mid-
dle of 2007 on, especially in the United States and
Britain, and how they jumped when the US govern-
ment let Lehman Brothers file for bankruptcy in
September 2008.
Until then, financial markets had assumed that the
government would not let large,
systemic banks fail. The failure
of Lehman Brothers, and the
fact that claims on Lehman
became frozen for a long time,
convinced them otherwise, lead-
ing to a very large jump in the
spread. (Note the partial decline
at the very end. I shall return to
it later.)
Associated with this large
increase in perceived counter-
party risk, was a sharp decrease
in the maturity of the loans that
banks were willing to make to
each other. The result was the
attempt, by each bank, to keep
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enough cash on hand and limit its reliance on bor-
rowing from other banks.
Tightening banking standards
One of the ways a financial crisis affects the econo-
my is through credit rationing, i.e. the tightening of
lending standards by banks that are deleveraging.
This is indeed what has happened.
Figure 6 shows the evolution of an index for
changes in bank lending standards in the United
States and the euro area, for both mortgage loans
and for commercial as well as industrial loans. The
index, which is based on a quarterly survey of bank
loan officers, reflects the difference between the
balance of respondents who say that they have
“tightened considerably/tightened somewhat” and
those who say that they have “eased somewhat/
eased considerably”. The figure
shows how credit has become
steadily tighter for firms and
households since mid-2008.
Emerging market spreads and 
sudden stops
Deleveraging has not been limit-
ed to domestic credit. For more
than a year after the start of the
financial crisis, it looked as if
emerging markets might be
shielded from the crisis.The pre-
mium that most emerging mar-
ket country governments had to
pay relative to the US govern-
ment (the “sovereign spread”)
was small and did not increase
much. As Figure 7 shows, things
changed dramatically, however,
in the fall of 2008. In the process
of deleveraging, advanced coun-
try banks started drastically
reducing their exposure to
emerging markets, closing credit
lines and repatriating funds.
Other investors did the same.
The selling was across the board
but not totally indiscriminate:
the figure shows that the premi-
um jumped up substantially
more for countries with large
current account deficits.
Deleveraging in the form of capital outflows pre-
sents additional macroeconomic problems. Not
only do countries have to deal with a domestic
credit problem (as banks experience a run and the
mechanisms we saw earlier are at work), but they
have to deal with the pressure on the exchange rate.
If they have reserves or if they have access to for-
eign credit (e.g. credit from central banks or loans
from the IMF), they can use them to limit the
depreciation. Otherwise, they may have to accept a
large depreciation that, if domestic liabilities are
denominated in foreign currency (which they often
are), leads to further burdens on debtors, be they
households, firms, or financial institutions. The
mechanism is familiar from past crises, especially
the Asian crisis, and can lead to major economic
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Figure 7From the financial crisis to a full-
fledged economic crisis
For some time after the start of
the financial crisis, its effects on
real activity appeared limited.
Yet, this did not last long. Lower
housing prices and lower stock
prices triggered initially by the
decreased stock market value of
financial institutions, higher risk
premia and credit rationing,
started taking their toll in the
second half of 2007.In the fall of
2008, however, the effect sud-
denly became much more pro-
nounced. The worry that the
financial crisis was becoming worse and might lead
to another Great Depression, led to a dramatic
decline in stock markets and to a dramatic fall in
consumer and firm confidence around the world.
Figure 8a shows the evolution of stock price indexes
from markets both in advanced economies and in
emerging market countries: After a long and steady
increase from 2002 on, stock prices started declining
in the second half of 2007 and then fell abruptly in
the fall of 2008. Figure 8b shows the evolution of
business confidence and consumer confidence. It
shows the dramatic fall in both indexes for the
United States, the euro area and emerging
economies in the fall of 2008.
In turn, these developments have led to a large
decrease in demand and in output. Figure 9 shows
the IMF growth forecasts as of mid-November:most
advanced countries now have
negative growth which will also
prevail in 2009. Emerging mar-
ket countries are expected to
have positive growth but much
lower than they have had in the
past. The world is clearly now
facing a major economic crisis.
Policies for the short run
It is clearly too late to change
the initial conditions which led
to the crisis. Thus, in thinking
about policies for the short run,
the purpose must be to dampen the two amplifica-
tion mechanisms.
Dampening the runs
The way to limit runs is conceptually straightfor-
ward: it is for the central bank to provide liquidity
against good enough collateral.If they have access to
such funds, financial institutions do not need to sell
assets at fire sale prices and the first amplification
mechanism does not operate.
This is exactly what central banks have done, acting
as “lenders of last resort” since the beginning of the
crisis.Traditionally, such liquidity provision was lim-
ited to banks, and the list of assets which could be
used as collateral was relatively narrow.What central
banks have done during this crisis is to steadily
increase both the set of institutions and the list of
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assets that qualify as collateral. In particular, the US
Federal Reserve has pursued an especially aggres-
sive liquidity policy since mid-2008. As a result, the
monetary base has increased from USD 841 billion
in August 2008 to USD 1.433 trillion in November,
an increase of USD 592 billion in four months.
Has this provision of liquidity been successful? The
answer appears to be yes, at least with respect to
domestic institutions. However, for those countries
suffering from capital outflows, including most
emerging market countries, things have been
tougher.A few countries have had access to credit in
foreign currency from the major central banks,in the
form of swap lines. But the others have been
exposed. Iceland, which had a very large banking
sector relative to its economy, with assets and liabili-
ties largely denominated in euros,became one of the
first major casualties of the crisis.Faced with runs (in
this case, the inability to borrow in money markets)
and not being part of the euro area and thus not hav-
ing access to the liquidity provided by the European
Central Bank, the three major Icelandic banks went
bankrupt, creating a deep economic crisis for the
country as a whole. Few countries are as exposed as
Iceland was. But many are likely to face similar runs
and may need quick access to foreign liquidity.
Asset purchases and recapitalization
The provision of liquidity eliminates the amplifica-
tion mechanism. It does not, however, address the
reestablishment of capital ratios. Based on the evi-
dence from the resolution of a large number of pre-
vious banking crises that occurred in a large number
of countries, what needs to be done is fairly well
established and has basically two
components.
First, the state must isolate bad
or potentially bad assets. There
are various approaches to doing
this.One is to leave the assets on
the balance sheet of the institu-
tions, but the state provides a
floor to their value in exchange,
for example, for shares in the
institution.Another,which I find
more attractive,is for the state to
take the assets off the balance
sheet altogether by buying them
in exchange for cash or for safe
assets such as government
bonds. The central question is that of the price at
which to buy them. One can think of two extreme
prices: the (pre-intervention) market price, which
may well be a fire sale price and thus embody a large
liquidity discount; or the estimated expected present
value – known as the “hold to maturity” price. The
right solution is to set the price between these two
extremes, giving, on the one hand, institutions incen-
tives to sell and, on the other hand, taxpayers a rea-
sonable expectation that, if the assets are indeed
held to maturity by the state,they will actually bene-
fit from the purchase in the long run.
The effect of such asset purchases is twofold. First, it
sets the value of the assets on the balance sheets and,
by reducing uncertainty, it allows investors to better
assess the risk of insolvency. Second, it increases the
price of these assets from their fire sale price to
something closer to their underlying expected value
and thus improves the balance sheets of all the insti-
tutions that hold these assets directly or indirectly.
These purchases are, however, half of what needs to
be done.Once the value of the assets is clearer,some
institutions may turn out to be insolvent and thus
should be closed. Most are likely to show positive,
but too low, capitalization and therefore must be
recapitalized.This can be done through public funds
only or through matching public and private funds in
exchange for shares. The purpose is to return these
institutions to a level of capital so that they do not
need to further deleverage, to further sell assets or
cut credit.
Where are we today on these two fronts? For some
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Figure 9thus a problem to be handled by the central banks
through liquidity provision. In the fall of 2008, it
became clear that undercapitalization was a major
issue. In October 2008, the United States introduced
the “troubled asset relief program (TARP)”, allow-
ing the Treasury to buy assets or inject capital up to
USD 700 billion.A few weeks later, major countries
agreed to put in place financial programs along the
lines sketched above at the meetings held both in
Washington and in Paris.Since then,France has com-
mitted to spend up to EUR 40 billion, Germany up
to EUR 80 billion, the United Kingdom GBP 50 bil-
lion, etc. In addition, in order to alleviate worries
about solvency before the programs are fully imple-
mented, most governments have extended the guar-
antees accorded to depositors to interbank claims
that are claims of banks on other banks.
The size and the complexity of the required pro-
grams are enormous and many governments are still
exploring their way.Particularly in the United States
the TARP appears to have changed direction twice,
with an initial focus on the purchase of troubled
assets through auctions,then a shift in focus to recap-
italization,and in the more recent past,(for example,
in the case of Citigroup) a reliance on both, provid-
ing a floor on the value of some of the assets on the
balance sheet and recapitalization. Other programs
appear to be more consistent but the funds are being
disbursed slowly.
Are these programs working? The verdict is mixed.
As Figure 10 shows, the spread between the inter-
bank lending rate and the T-bill rate has declined but
remains surprisingly high despite the interbank guar-
antees and the recapitalization of some banks. Little
has been done to dispose of bad assets and public
capital injections have been limited. Uncertainty
about the course and the details of policy has made
private investors hesitant to invest funds without
knowing the nature of future public interventions.
The result is that deleveraging continues with banks
continuing to reduce credit both domestic and
abroad.
Issues of coordination are also at work. The provi-
sion of guarantees for some assets can lead investors
to move into those assets, making things worse for
non-guaranteed assets. We have seen this in the
United States for non-guaranteed mortgages. The
provision of guarantees by one country can lead
investors to move to that country, making things
worse for other countries. This was the case, for
example, when Ireland unilaterally offered guaran-
tees to investors in the fall of 2008. Putting capital
controls in one country to slow down capital out-
flows can lead to the perception that other countries
will do the same, therefore triggering capital out-
flows in those countries. Protecting domestic deposi-
tors and investors at the expense of foreign deposi-
tors and investors can create the risk of major out-
flows from depositors and investors in similar situa-
tions elsewhere and the risk of similar measures by
other countries. The attempt by Iceland to do just
that led Britain to invoke an anti-terrorist law to get
Iceland to change its mind. Finally, guarantees and
other measures taken in advanced countries make it
more attractive for investors to put their funds in
these countries and can consequently lead to further
capital outflows from emerging market countries.As
Figure 11 shows, the sovereign spreads on emerging
countries have decreased from their October height
but they remain very high.
I have focused on the measures
needed on the financial side.The
sharp fall both in demand and
output in the past couple of
months also requires measures
to increase demand. Interest
rates of government bonds are
already very low,so the scope for
using traditional monetary poli-
cy is limited. The focus must be
now on other policies. On the
monetary side,“quantitative eas-
ing” which is the purchase of
assets other than government
bonds by the central bank, can
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reduce spreads in dysfunctional credit markets. It is
clear,however,that fiscal policy has to play a central
role here.At the time of this writing, most countries
are developing fiscal packages, intended at increas-
ing demand directly and decreasing the perceived
risk of another “Great Depression”. The IMF has
argued for a 2 percent global fiscal expansion,with a
commitment to do more if the macroeconomic situ-
ation becomes worse than current forecasts.
Sustaining world demand is likely to be a central
issue in the next few months.
Policies to avoid a repeat 
Looking forward beyond the crisis (something diffi-
cult to do these days), the following questions arise:
how can we avoid a repeat of the same scenario?
And how can we decrease the fragility of the finan-
cial system without impeding its efficiency too
much? Much work is already going on both in inter-
national institutions and in academic departments,
ranging from the examination of rules governing rat-
ing agencies to constraints on executive compensa-
tion, to rules for valuing assets on balance sheets to
the construction of regulatory capital ratios, and so
on. I have neither the expertise nor the time here to
go into details.But I can try to give you a sense of the
broad directions.
Recall my basic argument that the scope of the crisis
is due to the interaction between initial conditions
and amplification mechanisms.We have already dis-
cussed how liquidity provision and state intervention
can dampen the amplification mechanisms. The
remaining question in our context is:should we try to
avoid recreating some of the ini-
tial conditions which led to the
crisis?
Some of these initial conditions
are clearly here to stay.
Securitization and, by implica-
tion, relatively complex deriva-
tive securities allow for a much
better allocation of risk. The
challenge is to prevent complex-
ity from turning into opacity;
here we can probably do much
better than we have done in the
past. Or, to take another initial
condition, cross-border activities
and large cross-border positions
are also essential to competition and the allocation
of funds and risk in the world. They should not and
will not go away.
What should be done is to decrease leverage.
Leverage of the financial system as a whole was
almost surely too high before the crisis. Regulation
can enforce lower leverage. This requires, however,
increasing the perimeter of regulation beyond banks
to many other financial institutions. The challenge
here is how and where to draw the perimeter,
whether, for example, to put hedge funds in or out,
and,if they are in,what rules to put them under.One
must also go beyond leverage within the financial
system and look at leverage for the economy as a
whole: highly levered firms or households are also
highly exposed to small fluctuations in the value of
their assets.The irony is that many existing tax rules
favor such leverage, ranging from the tax deductibil-
ity of mortgage interest payments by households to
the tax deductibility of interest payments by firms.
We have to revisit these rules.
Even if and when new regulation is introduced and
tax laws are changed, we should be under no illusion
that systemic risk will be fully under control.
Regulation will be imperfect at best, and always lag
behind financial innovation.There will still be benign
times and they will lead to underestimation of risk
(the first of the initial conditions I listed above).Thus,
a major task of regulators will be to monitor and, if
needed, react timely to increases in systemic risk. In
doing so, they will face two sets of challenges.
The first is about monitoring itself,what information
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Figure 11systemic risk, both at the national and international
level. Some of the information needed is just not
available today. We do not know, for example, the
distribution of CDS positions among investors and
countries.This is one of the reasons why many advo-
cate moving trading from over the counter to a cen-
tralized exchange; this would allow, in particular, for
better collection of information. And, even if the
information becomes available, how to construct
measures of systemic risk is a difficult conceptual
exercise.We are surely not there yet.
The second challenge is how to react when measures
of systemic risk increase. Pro-cyclical capital ratios,
in which capital ratios increase either in response to
activity or to some index of systemic risk, sound like
an attractive automatic stabilizer. They can dampen
the build-up of risk on the way up, and the amplifi-
cation mechanisms on the way down. The challenge
lies clearly in the details of the design, the choice of
an index, the degree of pro-cyclicality.
Another avenue is to use monetary policy more
actively. The idea that monetary policy should be
used to fight asset price or credit booms is an old and
controversial idea. Before the crisis, some consensus
had developed that monetary policy was a very poor
tool to fight asset price booms, and it should care
only about asset prices to the extent that such prices
had effects on current or prospective inflation. The
crisis has certainly reopened the debate.
Conclusion
Let me end where I started. This lecture is being
written in the middle of the crisis.And, as I write it,
the crisis appears to be entering yet a new phase, in
which a drop in confidence is leading to a drop in
demand and a major recession.This, in turn, raises a
set of new issues, from the dangers arising from the
interaction between a deep recession and a weak-
ened financial system,to the risk of deflation and liq-
uidity traps, to further capital outflows from emerg-
ing countries and sudden stops, to an increased risk
of trade wars, to the effects of the collapse of com-
modity prices on low-income countries. I am afraid
you will have to invite me again next year for an
update.
References
Calomiris, C. (2008), The Subprime Turmoil: What’s Old, What’s
New, and What’s Next, Paper presented at the 9th Jacque Polak
Annual Research Conference, November 13–14,Washington DC.
Claessens,S.,A.Kose and M.Terrones (2008),What Happens during
Recessions, Crunches, and Busts?, IMF Working Paper 08/274.
Foote, C., K. Gerardi, L. Goette and P. Willen (2008), Subprime
Facts: What (We Think) We Know about the Subprime Crisis and
What We Don’t, Public Policy Discussion Papers,Federal Reserve of
Boston, http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2008/ppdp0802.pdf.
Gorton,G.(2008),The Panic of 2007,Yale ICF Working Paper 08-24.
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2007), Global Financial
Stability Report – Financial Market Turbulence: Causes, Conse-
quences, and Policies, October 2007,Washington DC.
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2008a), World Economic
Outlook:Financial Stress,Downturns and Recoveries, October 2008,
Washington DC.
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2008b), Global Financial
Stability Report – Financial Stress and Deleveraging, Macro-
Financial Implications and Policy, October 2008,Washington DC.
CESifo Forum 1/2009 14
Munich Lecture